Israel can strike Iran soon
Over the past four years – with greater or lesser degree of intensity – experts in international security have been discussing a propensity of Israel’s preemptive strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. However, in the next 3-6 months, an Israeli strike on Iran has particularly strong chances to become a reality. My forecast is based on analysis of the following factors. First. International efforts to resolve the Iranian problem by political and diplomatic means are not bringing tangible results: Tehran continues to produce enriched uranium in quantities potentially sufficient to produce nuclear weapons. Moreover, according to some recent estimates, Iran has already accumulated weapon-related material in quantities that suffice to produce at least one nuclear warhead. Second. In parallel with their advancement of nuclear capability, Iranian specialists have substantially improved their ballistic missile technology, It enables them to expand the geography of spots that can be hit by weapons of mass destruction: for example, as shown by the 2008 tests of ground-to-surface missiles “Shahab -3”, the flight range of Iranian ballistic missiles increases to two thousand kilometers. These developments present a classic security dilemma for Israel.Third. Last June Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won presidential elections in Iran and secured his second term in office. His implacable attitude towards the Jewish state, which he deems necessary to “wipe off the map”, is well known. According to the Iranian legislation, an individual’s presidency is limited by two consecutive terms, the third term is possible, but after a time interval. For Israel, a new four-year term of Ahmadinejad – a staunch supporter of the national nuclear program – is likely to signify a period of unprecedented strategic risks. Fourth. In Israel, policy changes are also evolving as the new right-wing government led by Benjamin Netanyahu, is seeking to gain popular support. Small wonder, the military realm is of a top priority given the specifics of the country’s geopolitcs. While Netanyahu is known for his personal intransigence, his foreign and security policy is marked by a much more independent and adamant stance than that of his predecessors. In some key instances –the Israeli settlements and the Iranian issue – this position strikingly differs from the approach of Tel-Aviv’s major ally, the United States. Compare Obama’s conciliatory tone towards Iran with the Israeli Prime Minister’s pertinent statements, e.g. his plead to decisively prevent a recurrence of the Holocaust. Fifth. Netanyahu and Obama identified different deadlines for Iran to make real steps toward abandoning its uranium enrichment program – August and December of 2009 respectively. Thus, if in autumn 2009, or, at least, in the early 2010 it becomes finally clear that the relevant steps have not been taken by Tehran, and, consequently, the international diplomatic efforts to negotiate with Iran have proved to be futile, an ultimate Israeli military strike on Iran to prevent it from going nuclear would have no alternative.
