False sense of security
Many years ago while waiting for my plane at Reagan Airport in Washington, I watched the ground handlers at the the airport and realized, given the relatively low wages they likely were paid, that someone could “buy” a number of them for less than $500,000. This would give the “buyer” access to planes. Drug dealers discovered this long before I did, and so too has organized crime. I wonder if terrorists also have discovered this?
Why do I mention this – because I have spent a considerable amount of time, largely as a result of work I have done in the airline industry, trying to find the weak links in the existing security systems. Put a small number of intelligent people in a room for an hour or so, and they will come up with more ways to circumvent security systems than terrorists ever will.
I also have concluded that there is no fool-proof system. There always will be gaps for a creative group. Fortunately, terrorists have not yet shown themselves to be that smart. However, our existing system of security at airports is even dumber. Intelligence is not coordinated and anywhere near comprehensive. How could the system not stop a person who paid cash for a one-way ticket, and checked no bags? If the system cannot stop such a person, it cannot stop anyone!
Furthermore, the front line security personnel are likely poorly paid and trained. They remind me of the ground handlers at Reagan. How much would it take to buy a number of them at any major airport around the world? So a starting point must involve hiring better people, training them more effectively, and of course, paying them much better.
New screening technology also will help. But how long before someone uploads onto YouTube some pictures form the full body scanners?
Since we must go down the technology path, then why not look beyond screening as it is currently conducted?
The U.S. could take the lead in demanding that the airline industry worldwide adopt a new card (the size of current credit cards) with an embedded computer chip for all travelers. This card could be developed and issued by IATA. The computer chip would contain passport information for each person, credit card information, a DNA sample, an iris scan or fingerprint, and a continual record of all visas and travel by air.
Any airline or airport which would not use this card could be denied access/connections to the global airline market. The card would be required to gain access to an airport, possibly through a turnstile where the card would be scanned to ensure that person was booked on a flight; to check that the person was indeed the person to whom the card was originally issued; and to cross-check the flight history and name against a list of possibly suspicious individuals and places. Only if the person passed the original screening would s/he be allowed into the airport. Otherwise, this person would be subject to secondary screening prior to entry into the airport.
During the transition, accommodation would have to be made for travelers without a card. Frequent travelers should be given priority in getting these cards so that they could be fast tracked through an airport and onto their flights.
But of course, not everyone would want a card. Consequently, these travelers should be subject to intensive screening before they would be allowed entry into an airport, and they should not be allowed any carry-ons. Inconvenience, including the possibility of missing flights, should be the price to pay for not having a card. It is time to move to a multi-tier screening system at airports.
At a second point of security inside the airport, profiling should be used. Profiled individuals with a card would be subject to much less intensive and intrusive screening than those with a card.
The flow of people could and should be accelerated, and only a handful of people would choose to be inconvenienced by security. However, the new system should be reinforced by more intelligent gathering, use and sharing of information on all potential travelers. And, a first line of defense should continue to be rooting out terrorist safe havens and training grounds. Freezing access to money should become a critical part of the defensive strategy as well.
The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.
Hmm… what about stolen cards?? Our credit cards and other cards get stolen quite easily. I don’t see why such cards can’t be stolen and other issues of false identities.