Tariq Ramadam’s North American visit is raising the usual series of arguments. The Swiss born scholar and public speaker is the grandson of Hassan Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 1928. Mr Ramadam has been declared persona non grata in various Middle Eastern states and has been banned from entering others on various occasions. To some, he is the voice of a new form of moderate Islam which could be compatible with Western democratic values. To others, he is the voice of duplicity with messages that vary depending on the audience.

But what about the baggage he carries - that being the grandson of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood? Also known as the Ikwan, the Muslim Brotherhood has a decidedly mixed history. It has at times been a violent terrorist group, but in later days, it has sworn off violence as a tactic. They remain listed as a terrorist group in Egypt, even though they ceased violence there in 1973 and have members sitting (unofficially) in the Egyptian Parliament. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria followed suit in 1983 and have since abstained from major acts of political violence.

While many of the international arms of the Muslim Brotherhood have also sworn off violence, others have not. HAMAS, which is viewed as the Palestinian arm of the Muslim Brotherhood, is still listed as a terrorist group by some countries. It military wing, the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades is also listed as a terrorist group. Political violence and terrorism has been a common activity for HAMAS.

But what of the Muslim Brotherhood in North America (Canada and the United States)? Where does it stand and how does it perceive its role? Consider the views of the North American Muslim Brotherhood in their own words which recently came to light in the United States as the result of a criminal prosecution and conviction of the Holy Land Foundation. In their Explanatory Memorandum on the General Strategic Goal for the Group In North America they make the statement that their work is a “kind of grand Jihad in eliminating and destroying the Western civilization from within and ’sabotaging’ its miserable house by their hands and the hands of the believers so that it is eliminated…”

In the document noted above, the Muslim Brotherhood in North America also provides what it describes as a list of our organizations and the organizations of our friends. At the very top of the list of 29 organizations is the ISNA (Islamic Society of North America) and the MSA (Muslim Students Association).

Ironically, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in the United States and the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) in Canada both list the ISNA as federal charities which can offer tax receipts for donors. Other organizations or “friends” of the Muslim Brotherhood are also listed by the IRS as charities such as the North American Islamic Trust and the Islamic Circle of North America.

One thing is clear from a reading of this document. The role of the Muslim Brotherhood is not to protect and nurture the growth of a new and “Western” form of Islam, nor is it there to provide an institutional voice to protect mainstream Muslims. Rather, it perceives itself an organization which is aimed, along with its allies, at undermining the various institutions of the state over an extended period of time.

The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

State Immunity and Terrorist Financing

Money is the lifeblood of any operation, and a terrorist operation is no exception. Terrorists require funds for a whole range of activities including recruiting, training and paying operatives; traveling; document forgery; bribing corrupt officials; and purchasing weapons.

Simply put, innocent civilians cannot be killed by bullets or bombs that terrorists cannot afford to purchase. Thus, an effective campaign against terrorism must consist of multiple approaches, including direct and indirect attacks on the flow of money. Enforcement and intelligence actions are necessary, but they can only address the problem at the tactical and operational level. Therefore, in order to maximize our ability to deter terrorist activity, action must also take place at the financial level.

There are two main approaches to disrupting the financial aspects of terrorism. The first approach is to intercept money flows - in other words, to track and attack money transfers from sponsor to attacker. The second, and the most effective one, is to remove the financial benefactors, facilitators and service providers from the equation. These are the individuals, organizations and even foreign states that silently and inconspicuously sponsor terrorism through their financial and logistical support. There should be no confusion about the significance of even small amount of money and logistical support for terrorist operations. Nor should there be any doubt about the effectiveness of any financial and logistical disruptions, even minor ones, on terrorist activity.

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Canada strengthened its criminal laws related to the financing of terrorism. However, despite the magnitude of the terrorist economy - supported by both legitimate sources (such as donations from businesses and charitable organizations) and criminal sources (such as fraud, kidnapping and the drug trade) - the criminal prosecution of terror sponsorship has proven very difficult. Victor Comras, who was appointed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan as one of five international monitors to oversee the implementation of Security Council measures against terrorism and terror financing, has noted that: “Most major terrorism’s financial abettors and supporters…have successfully avoided criminal prosecution… The record on closing down entities and institutions feeding terrorism is even more dismal.”

It is not at all clear that Canada’s existing legal framework provides adequate constraints on terrorist financing in, from or through this country. What is clear, however, is that in order to combat terrorism effectively, new and innovative strategies are required. One example of such innovative effort is reflected in the work of the Canadian Coalition Against Terror (C-CAT).

Over the last five years, C-CAT has worked on an important piece of federal legislation that would enable Canadian terror victims and their families to launch civil lawsuits against foreign states and local Canadian organizations and individuals that have supported terrorist entities responsible for the death or injury of these victims.

Criminal prosecution is certainly an important tool in stopping terrorist operatives and their financial supporters. However, by harnessing the possibility of civil lawsuits against the sponsors of terror, the proposed legislation opens a vital avenue in interdicting and defeating terrorist funding. The proposed legislation would have many important benefits, four of which will be addressed here.

First, successful civil suits can deter future acts of violence by bankrupting or financially impairing the terrorist infrastructure through successful judgments.

Second, even the threat of a civil suit may cause terror sponsors to refrain from future sponsorship out of fear of the publicity and exposure that would result from being named in a civil suit. It is true that terrorists themselves are unlikely to be deterred by the threat of an arrest, a criminal trial, or a civil suit. Such measures will be particularly ineffective against suicide bombers of groups such as the LTTE or al-Qaeda. But the direct and indirect supporters of terrorism have no desire to be brought to court. They have businesses to run, families to support and reputations to protect. In other words, they have much to lose if they can be identified or held accountable for terrorist support.

Third, civil suits have the ability to hold the wrongdoers responsible even where the criminal system has failed. The burden of proof in criminal law must meet the “beyond a reasonable doubt” test, a standard of proof that is extremely high. Unfortunately, the complex financial networks that fund global terrorism have rendered the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard unattainable in most cases. In contrast, the standard of proof in civil cases is on “a balance of probabilities”. This standard is met if the proposition in question is more likely to be true than not true. Thus, evidence that establishes a defendant’s status as a supporter of terror, which may not be sufficient for conviction in a criminal proceeding, can be enough to establish liability and obtain damages in a civil proceeding.

Fourth, this legislative proposal by C-CAT would correct a glaring deficiency in Canadian law that allows a foreign state to be sued in Canadian courts for a breach of commercial contract but not for sponsoring terrorist groups that kill Canadians abroad. As Dr. Peter M. Leitner of George Mason University has pointed out: “There is something fundamentally absurd with the current legal arrangement in Canada that allows lawsuits against Iran for selling you rotten pistachios, but bars legal action against them for sponsoring terrorist acts which kill Canadian citizens abroad…” C-CAT’s legislation would create a new exception to state immunity: a foreign state would be held accountable in a Canadian court for deliberate terror sponsorship that leads to Canadian deaths or injuries.

The Government of Canada has committed to seeing this type of legislation passed in Parliament, and we urge them to do so without any further delay. This is an important – and as yet ignored – piece of the puzzle in combating terror financing, and by extension, terrorism itself.

The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

But the biggest problem with his statement is not moral or legal. It is practical. The policy was a failure in producing useful intelligence. Speaking to the BBC, Mr Rove stated that:

“I’m proud that we used techniques that broke the will of these terrorists and gave us valuable information that allowed us to foil plots such as flying aeroplanes into Heathrow and into London, bringing down aircraft over the Pacific, flying an aeroplane into the tallest building in Los Angeles and other plots.”

Note that Mr Rove claims that the policy of torture against individual such as Khalid Sheik Mohammed (known as KSM) prevented an attack in Los Angeles. The problem with this statement is that it is a total fabrication. The “Library Tower Plot” was announced to the public by President Bush in 2002. KSM as not captured until 2003. Much the same can be said for the rest of the “intelligence” produced by this program.

This false belief has been used before to justify the policy of torture that was generated by the United States Department of Justice. Note the CIA memo of 30 May 2005. This memo again states that water boarding KSM resulted in stopping the Library Tower attack in Los Angeles. KSM was tortured 183 times. The memo reads:

You have informed us that the interrogation of KSM - once enhanced techniques were employed - led to the discovery of a KSM plot, the “Second Wave,” “to use East Asian operatives to crash a hijacked airliner into” a building in Los Angeles.

Mr Rove and others like him who openly advocate the use of torture are making America and its allies unsafe. Torture, as a policy, does not produce effective or timely intelligence. This has been proven yet again as the so-called intelligence produced from the torture of KSM and Abu Zubaydah has proven to be incorrect or misleading. As such, the intelligence and law enforcement communities have wasted years of efforts pursuing avenues of investigation which have been fruitless.

Worse still, torture in places such as Guantanamo Bay and Abu Gharib have provided the advocates of terrorism with amazing propaganda opportunities. They could never create such opportunities by themselves. This aids the recruiting of yet more terrorists who “believe” that America is truly evil and the proof is provided by none other than senior figures such as Karl Rove himself.

So why do individuals such as Karl Rove and former CIA official Michael Scheuer advocate the use of torture? Michael Scheuer had advocated in 2009 that anyone who spoke out against torture was anti-American. This included American citizens. Mr Scheuer is also the same person who says he hopes that al Qaeda attacks America again so US government policy will change, presumably to support more of the self-defeating policy of torture and other such measures. In an interview in July 2009 on Fox News, Mr Scheuer stated:

“The only chance we have as a country right now is for Osama bin Laden to deploy and detonate a major weapon in the United States. … It’s an absurd situation again, only Osama can execute an attack which will force Americans to demand that their government protect them effectively, consistently, and with as much violence as necessary.”

Is Karl Rove part of this same belief structure? Does he really believe that America should abdicate its Constitution and its most fundamental principles at a time when a political victory over the narratives and beliefs of terrorism is most required?

Unfortunately, the outspoken beliefs of Karl Rove and similar figures will only serve to plug an amplifier into the terrorist propaganda machine. As a result, we are all less safe.

The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

The Commission of Inquiry into the Investigation of the Bombing of Air India Flight 182 was carried out by Mr Justice Major, a retired Supreme Court judge. A total of 331 people died as a result of two bombs which exploded on 23 June 1985, of which 270 were Canadian citizens.

To date, this remains the largest case of mass murder in Canadian history. It is also the largest loss of life due to a terrorist attack on a single aircraft. No one has been jailed in Canada for the offense, other than Inderjit Singh Reyat, who pleaded guilty in 2003 for his role in obtaining materials for the bombs. The perpetrators of this mass murder remain at large in Canada or may have died while they were in India.

The report will be extensive, probably running over 5,000 pages of text. The length of the report is due to the extensive breadth of the investigation. In addition to the information about the intelligence and enforcement activities that led up to the bombing, the report will also examine issues related to current counter terrorism practices, air safety regulations and other issues related to the uses and efficacy of domestic and foreign intelligence. Due to such broad spectrum of issues, the Air India Inquiry became a combination of several investigational efforts placed under one large umbrella.

What is not yet clear is if the report will ‘point fingers’ and ‘name names’. The events that led to the bombing in 1985 are already relatively well known, including the event’s main personalities and issues. Nevertheless, the report will certainly be considered as one of the most important and historical cases, especially given the fact that it may produce judgments on current terrorist-related activities. One other interesting aspect of this report will be its views on the testimony by various senior officials who were called to testify about current counter terrorism activities and intelligence practices. As per Air India case, it is believed that some of the testimonies were not comprehensive enough or misleadng and not all of the information requested was provided by the witnesses.

Of course those who will be the most interested in the report are those who had iheavily invested in the Inquiry – the grieving families of the victims. To date, the various investigations and inquiries have not provided convictions, nor has a sense of finality or closure been acquired.

As for Canadian government, the report will certainly provide fuel for further debate about the roles and responsibilities of the security and intelligence community in their undertaking of terrorism cases. To date, the efforts of the Canadian law enforcement community in producing relatively positive outcomes can be seen through the Khawaja conviction in Ottawa, the series of convictions in the “Toronto 18” case, and the recent conviction of Said Namouh in Quebec. At the same time, however, other procedures such as the National Security Certificate cases are struggling as it was demonstrated by the total vindication of one suspected terrorist, Hassan Almrei, and the withdrawal of charges against another, Adil Charkaou. Also, the ongoing case of Mohammad Harkat has produced a series of rulings and unfavorable comments including one when a Federal Court judge accused the government of an “institutional failure” due to the poor performance of the government witnesses. The reasons for the complications are complex, but the use of knowledge and intelligence lie at the roots.

What is evident is that the report will certainly confirm the importance of the ongoing and future counter terrorism efforts by the security and intelligence community. However, it is still unclear how the two can ever be efficiently reconciled within the existing institutional structure.

It is possible that the Air India Report will result in a move towards increasing the role of enforcement or it may be the catalyst for a new national security agency that would manage the intelligence and enforcement functions all under one roof. Such agencies already exist in other countries, such as Denmark, and it is quite feasible for Canada to adopt similar structure and practices proven, of course, that such format is suitable for Canadian political and legal environment.

The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

Terrorism is a political act which aims to sow fear among the target population through violence and propaganda. The aim of this act is to force political change. In today’s world of fast paced social media, one of terrorism’s strengths lies in the fact that political agendas can be affected quickly. Terrorism is also the methodology of the weak. If an idea or a cause actually had substantive factual support or strength, it would not need to resort to the language and tactics of violence to gain attention for its narrative or message.

Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch “Freedom Party” or PVV, is a dream come true for the purveyors of terrorist ideologies in Europe, and especially in the Netherlands. He is the near perfect embodiment of the political overreaction that terrorism requires in order to sustain its strength and advance its momentum. Without such an over-reactive force, the ideology of terrorism cannot gain the influence it wants. Wilders is, in essence, using his own radical ideas to plug an amplifier into the propaganda of terrorist groups such as al Qaeda or the locally grown “Hofstad Group.”

In order to support his work, Mr Wilders needs the ideology and narrative of terrorism because the absence of such a narrative would render his rhetoric irrelevant. Therefore, he continues to divide the Dutch population with the narrative that generates nothing constructive but a sense of fear and hate, in order to gain further support for his own dogmatic principles.

Aside from using actual explosives, Mr Wilders employs the same basic methodologies that are used by terrorist groups. This is, unfortunately, an increasingly common practice among politicians in many countries who wish to use fear as a road to power. He uses the method of lashing out at individuals and groups while using the language of violence and fear. He then moves quickly to the next attack without trying to justify or defend the previous offensive. Like a terrorist, he knows that the idea of trying to defend the indefensible cannot work. This is most likely the reasoning behind Mr. Wilders refusal to take up a seat in the European Union Parliament which his party won in June 2009. If he were to have to sit still long enough to defend his ideas and positions, Mr. Wilders would be subjected to attacks which he might find difficult to counter.

Perhaps, Mr. Wilders will also encounter the same problems in defending his rhetoric as Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri of al Qaeda. Dr. Zawahiri tried to defend al Qaeda’s actions by creating an online “question and answer” forum. It was designed in a way that individuals were able to pose questions to al Qaeda’s number two leader to which he would later respond. It turned out that Zawahiri was so viciously attacked by other Muslims over his policies, especially those that encouraged murder of innocent people, that he dropped the online forum and never attempted such open discussion again.

The irony of Mr Wilder’s position is that he does discuss some serious issues. Immigration and integration concerns need to be addressed, especially as they relate to economic and nationalist issues. But attempting to create a wave of fear through overreactions will not produce useful responses. Mr Wilder’s tactics may bring him closer to power, but only at the cost of further hate and fear in the Netherlands. The main benefactors of his political campaign will be those individuals who are attempting to force political change through targeted violence – the terrorists.

The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

Despite much discussion concerning the decline of the influence of the state, the reality is that the state can chose to exercise significant control over its territory. Borders still exist and the state can exercise its influence when it chooses. In order to cross a border into a state, (physically or electronically) the individual, commodity or transaction is still subject to border controls. Ironically, as we advance towards a more globalized world, individuals and commodities are increasingly subject to surveillance and interception as they must cross borders to be a part of this globalized existence.

Border rules are different from most other inland rules, so the intelligence collected will be different from other domestic or international means of collection. By simply asking for access to another country, you agree to give up certain rights which exist under other circumstances. When you are in the “grey zone” between two borders, you are subject to an entirely different regime of rights and obligations. And the rights are few while the obligations area many. Border officials in almost all countries have strong powers to question, search or detain individuals as they attempt to cross national borders, unlike inland officials or police agencies.

Border intelligence exists and will grow as an independent discipline because borders are real and globalization is spreading. By the simple act of asking for access or by crossing a border, you are required to provide certain information. When information is collected at a border because of national requirements and it is subsequently analysed and used to provide warning or understanding, this is border intelligence. In terms of purpose, the use of border intelligence is not really any different than other forms of intelligence: it is there to provide advice to decision makers.

But should we be looking at border intelligence as a separate construct or should we examine it for its purpose. The answer would seem to be as a construct, as that is where the differences lie.

The state will often choose not to exercise its will at borders, preferring to allow the free flow of commerce, even thought it knows individuals will smuggle consumer goods across the border. The state could choose to inspect every car and truck, but this would be economically inefficient. The state chooses to risk manage these problems instead. Border intelligence is a pre-condition to managing risk, as risk management could not be achieved without intelligence-led indicators determining which entry to target.

However, the concept of “borders” is now regaining strength and it will gain further influence as we learn to face a series of asymmetric and symmetrical threats. Many threats now, such as transnational terrorism and organized crime, are from non-state actors. These non-traditional threats cannot be met with raw power. The only effective way to meet asymmetric threats is knowledge (i.e. intelligence).

For the purposes of intelligence collection, what are borders and where do they exist? The classic border is a line drawn on the ground which demarcates the territory of two bordering states. The Canada-US border and the US-Mexican border come to mind for most North Americans. However, we also have maritime borders which are essentially the same, albeit no line drawn in the water. International airports have “borders” even if they are located inland and are distant from the nearest land border. Countries also have “air borders” which they can choose to control of defend. At a certain point in space, an aircraft must ask for permission to enter airspace or face retaliation. The concept of multiple borders has also advanced the notion that one nation has various points along a continuum where collection and interdiction can be achieved.

Many Canadians think that their country has one border and many Americans think that they have only two borders with Canada and Mexico. The reality is, however, that the number of borders for Canada and the USA is really closer to 200. Air travel and marine transportation now mean that anyone can travel from anywhere on the globe and enter North America in 24 hours or less in most cases. As such, the state must concern itself with goods, services and people that originate in 194 officially recognized states or other territories that are not states (Taiwan, the Palestinian Territories etc).

And what of cyber space? Is it really “borderless?” The reality is that the Internet is not some imaginary or ethereal non-corporeal being. It is a collection of wires, fibre optic cables, computers, servers, satellites and other forms of real-life hardware. The hardware is on national territory or under national control. When you send an email message from one country to another, the reality is that it leaves the country at some point (though a server) and it has to enter the country at a certain point (though a server). The state could, if it chose, shut down the flow of information through the main servers, albeit economic, social and legal implications would be quite staggering.

A larger national discussion on border intelligence should be occurring now so as to define it and understand it. The concept of oversight for intelligence is expanding and will continue to do so. Oversight will come to the Canadian Border Services Agency and others, so it may be best to lead the discussion now rather than react to it later.

The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

But what is the ideology of al Qaeda? Do those who make such observations and accusations understand this issue themselves?

When studying a terrorist group, it is useful to make a determination of four different aspects of the group: ideology, objectives, strategy and tactics. By understanding each of these, it is then possible to understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of the group. If the ideology and the objectives of the groups and in sync with each other, then this shows coherence at the leadership level. If the objectives of the group are consistent with its strategy and tactics, jthere is effective guidance from the leadership which must have a functioning command and control system. If these measures are not in sync with each other, however, then the group can be assumed to demonstrating weaknesses and its long term viability is questionable.

What is an ideology?

An ideology is a set of beliefs that are characteristic of a group or an individual in that group. The beliefs are the glue that binds the group together as it seeks to obtain its objectives. Ideology, as described by Andrew Heywood, can also be described as a “‘more or less coherent set of ideas that provide the basis for organized political action, whether it is intended to preserve, modify or overthrow the existing system of power.”

Does al Qaeda, and its inspired followers, have a set of beliefs that is coherent enough to be identified as an ideology? Is it then possible to look at the beliefs of a certain individual or group and make the claim that they “espouse” the ideology of al Qaeda. While a difficult question, the answer should be a qualified “yes”.

What constitutes this ideology? First of all, a worldview exists:

a. All Muslims nations are under attack all the time,
b. The only force resisting this is al Qaeda and its followers, and
c. You are either “for” al Qaeda or you are “supporting the oppressors” of Muslims. The exclusionary nature of these statements is a key factor in attempting to maintain group cohesion.

In addition to the world view, other key concepts exist within the ideology. According to Alex Schmid, a long time scholar of terrorism, some of these other key concepts are:

1. A sense of grievance exists in that the “Zionist-Christian” Crusader alliance is responsible for most of the wrongs,
2. There is a vision of the good society which will be a single political entity - the Caliphate – which will replace the corrupt Muslim regimes which rule most Muslim lands,
3. Al Qaeda will lead the path from the grievances to the good society of the future. This will be a violent Jihad, led by a heroic vanguard of al Qaeda leaders,
4. The pursuit of Jihad is an individual obligation for all Muslims,
5. No distinction is made between civilian and military targets in the fight against enemies and suicide/martyrdom (shaheed) operations are legitimate, despite the fact that Islam prohibits suicide, and
6. The killing of other Muslims should be regarded as “collateral damage” if these Muslims are opposing al Qaeda or cooperating with the oppressors.

It should be noted that simply having a belief in one or more of these ideas does not make an individual a “supporter” of al Qaeda. Nor does sharing one particular belief make a individual “associated” to al Qaeda. For instance, one key belief of most al Qaeda adherents was that American troops should have left Saudi Arabia after the First Gulf War. If a given individual also believed that American troops should have left after the war as well, does this mean they are “espousing” the beliefs of al Qaeda? Certainly, it does not. Many Arabs, Muslims and indeed other people from around the world believed that keeping American troops in the Saudi Kingdom after the war was a misguided policy.

Identifying and understanding the ideology of a terrorist group is critical for at least two reasons. The first is that it is imperative to “know one’s enemy” before figuring out how to attack that enemy. Given the political nature of terrorism, it is necessary to undermine the “message” or ideology of that group in order to weaken them and to reduce their ability to recruit new members. Such knowledge is also a requirement for targeting the right individuals. By targeting the wrong people, the state is not only wasting scarce resources, it is also increasing the sense of grievance and persecution that feeds the ideology in the first place.

The opinions expressed are personal and do not reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

The answer is yes. Words matter. Recent proceedings in Federal Court have drawn attention to this issue.

Academic literature, especially that from peer reviewed journals or from well known university professors, is assumed to be honest, well researched and reliable. If personal biases or institutional positions are involved, then the lack of impartiality should be readily identifiable at the outset of the article or book. It is also believed that academic articles should contain the relevant information that both supports and takes away from the argument of the academic writing the paper. This must be done in order to provide insight and balance into the arguments at stake. These are important assumptions, because academic work frequently finds itself quoted in fields of inquiry where words matter and have consequences.

An intersection exists between the academic world and the worlds of justice, law and intelligence. It can occur in many different areas such as criminal trials, civil trials in Federal Court, Commissions of Inquiry, government hearings at the House and Senate level, intelligence reports and in the press.

Governments must maintain high standards of information during public proceedings such as criminal and civil trials or in formal hearings. The integrity of the justice system is at stake as well as the general credibility of the government. Frequently, governments depend on the written works of academics to provide basic information or to add credibility to their arguments or positions.

This acceptance by the government – and by extension the public – puts a large amount of faith and trust in academia.

The impact of the academic information presented can be significant. In the Federal Court of Canada, where various cases related to terrorism and national security are heard, individuals can be deported or spend years in jail awaiting proceedings. Millions of dollars are spent on court costs. The reputation of the government and its justice and intelligence agencies as credible institutions are continuously under scrutiny. Time and energy may also be spent on cases which have misleading information when this effort could have been spent on other cases where actual threats exist.

The fields of terrorism and national security studies are often viewed with suspicion. Primary source information can be difficult to obtain, secrecy is an obsession in some governments, and ideological factors can cloud judgements. The sudden explosion of interest in terrorism studies after 9/11 has also caused a sudden influx of those studying or examining the issues. As well, terrorism studies have no disciplinary home. Among others, the field of enquiry into terrorism can include politics, history, international relations, military studies, sociology, psychology, psychiatry, economics, anthropology, religion and the hard sciences.

Due to the inherent problems in the field of study, academics need to be especially cautious in this area of study. If anything, academics and journals publishing in the field of terrorism and national security should be subjecting their articles to a more stringent level of review than many other fields.

A series of academic weaknesses, however, have been recently exposed as a result of hearings in the Federal Court of Canada concerning National Security Certificate cases. The examples involved information presented by the Government of Canada which has been derived from peer reviewed journal articles and books by academics. Other concerns have been raised about articles written by academics quoted from “thinks tanks” which maintain online websites and e-journals.

A pattern appears to be emerging as to the nature of the information provided which is of less-than-academic quality. The emerging patterns are:

1. A disconnect between the statement in the body of the article and the sources in the footnotes which do not back up the statement being made,
2. Strong statements which are made, but which are built on weak foundations or on assumptions which cannot be shown to be valid,
3. Information from two different situations is overlapped or mixed together, leaving the reader with a false impression about the nature of a particular problem or situation,
4. In a limited number of cases, information provided in articles is simply false.

No particular locus for these problems has emerged. The problems can come from lesser known universities or from “Ivy League” institutions. Those involved can be relatively junior or senior and they can be also be “star academics” or relative unknowns. Geography appears to play no role as the examples come from many different regions and countries.

The position of academics in today’s society may be somewhat diminished, but many are still granted authority and influence in the world of justice, law and intelligence. In order to sustain this position in the face of various pressures, academics must be able to show that they are worthy of the trust placed in them and in their institutions as a whole. Standards, as they say, must be maintained in order to preserve the credibility of the pursuit of knowledge. Unfortunately, individual weaknesses in some publications appear to be compounded by a lack of institutional oversight. While it is not clear that the problems are systemic, more discussion needs to occur on the issues of rigorous methods, honesty and good craft.

The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

One of the most quoted “facts” about al Qaeda is that the personal fortune of USD$300 million of Osama bin Laden was used to finance the organization. There is no $300 million personal fortune. This number was arrived at by taking the total estimated value of the Saudi bin Laden Group and then dividing it by 52 (the number of children conceived by the founder of the company, Mohamed bin Laden). The reality is that there is no evidence to show that the Saudi bin Laden Group was broken up and the assets divided among the children. Nor was any exception made for Osama himself, who was never a favoured son. By 1994 the break between the family, Osama bin Laden and the government of Saudi Arabia was nearly total in nature. By the time Osama bin Laden moved back to Afghanistan in 1996, most evidence shows that both he and his organization were nearly broke and had to reach out to private donors for money.

Another favoured urban legend is that al Qaeda has a “twenty year seven stage grand strategy for the jihadist struggle aimed at achieving a global Caliphate by the year 2020″ to achieve its goals. This is near total nonsense and has been repeated debunked. However, this “fact” still shows up on occasion. The basis of the rumour is a book written by the Jordanian journalist Faoud Hussein who reportedly interviewed two al Qaeda figures who told him about this grand plan. No one else has ever found evidence of this plan. The good news, however, is that we are in stage three of the plan now (if it is true) and there is nothing in the last four stages that calls for attacks on the West. If the “grand plan” is true, then the West is safe!

Another fascinating urban legend that makes the rounds is the “Al Qaeda weapons lab in Algeria” story. This story would have us believe that al Qaeda had a weapons lab in Algeria and an accidental spill killed some 40 operatives with the Bubonic Plague. The problem with this story is that it was completely fabricated and it has been debunked by intelligence agencies, the World Health Organization and the Atlanta Center for Disease Control. The story was most like a bit of disinformation that was being spread by the Algerian government. There is no indication that the Algerians ever wanted the story to spread beyond their own borders, but the London Sun picked up the story which was then repeated by the Washington Times. The “Times”, it should be noted, is owned by the Reverend Sun Moon.

Perhaps the most interesting story about al Qaeda, however, is the claim that is has a sleeper agent program. This claim was believed to be true by many serious intelligence agencies back in the time period from 1995 to 2001. However, the July 2004 9/11 Commission Report debunked the idea of a widespread sleeper agent network. Their report stated: The domestic agencies were waiting for evidence of a domestic threat from sleeper cells within the United States. No one was looking for a foreign threat to domestic targets. The threat was coming not from sleeper cells. It was foreign – but from foreigners who had infiltrated into the United States. The idea of sleeper agents was even further debunked when the head of the FBI (Robert Mueller) testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee in 2005 that his agency had found no evidence of sleeper agents. Despite these clear statements and the fact that no al Qaeda sleeper agent has ever carried out an attack in 20 years, the myth persists that somewhere out there a sleeper agent is in place. Much like the McCarthyism scare of 1950s in which people were looking everywhere for “reds under the bed,” we now have individuals who are looking for “Muslims under the mattress.”

Terrorism of all types is a real and persistent danger to society. However, it is necessary to have accurate and informed intelligence assessments about the threat. Policy and activity based on urban legends is unlikely to be effective.

The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.

On the surface, this would appear to be a good news story about the capture of a leading “bad guy” in the ongoing Afghanistan conflict. Below the surface, however, things are less certain. Several other possibilities exist as to why Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was “captured” at this time and what it actually means.

Mullah Baradar is one of the original Taliban members and he is a close confident of Mullah Omar, the Taliban leader. His capture may turn out to be a significant political victory and one that may demoralize some members of the Taliban. However, his removal from the chain of command may not have a major effect on the Taliban’s ability to mount operations in the field.

What is more interesting, however, is who “captured” Mullah Baradar and why. Mullah Baradar was reportedly arrested in Karachi in a joint US-Pakistan operation. This would directly infer that Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) was involved. It would be a rare event if the ISI was not at least informed of such an action before it occurred.

Given that the ISI and the US government were involved in the capture of the Taliban’s military leader and presumed number two man overall, several questions arise. The most interesting ones are:

a. Was Mullah Baradar involved in discussions with Saudi Arabia and others about a possible agreement with the government of President Karzai of Afghanistan? Given his seniority and leadership positions, nothing of consequence could be decided by the Taliban without his approving it.

b. Who can replace Mullah Baradar as the military commander or will the Taliban even announce a replacement? If he is replaced with a formal announcement, then this would seem to indicate that the Taliban believes that his services are lost to them and he will not return. If, however, there is no formal announcement of a replacement or another individual is given a temporary position as military commander, then this may indicate that the Taliban believes that Mullah Baradar may yet return to a position of some influence in the near future.

c. Who is actually holding Mullah Baradar and where will he surface next? If he reappears in Kabul as a guest who is under house arrest by the Afghan government, this is an indicator that he will be involved with further negotiations with the Karzai government. This in turn might suggest a possible negotiated outcome of the conflict.

d. Did the ISI arrange for or allow the “capture” Mullah Baradar in order to reinforce their own position? The ISI is one of the few agencies of the Pakistani government that can be said to have real influence and operational capabilities in Pakistan. If the ISI was aware that negotiations were ongoing between America, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, this may have angered them if they perceived that their own interests were being sidelined. If Mullah Baradar stays in Pakistani custody for an extended period of time, then this may indicate a larger role of the ISI in future negotiations.

The government of President Karzai is already troubled with serious internal clan fighting and killings, a weakened position following last year’s election debacle and ongoing charges of corruption and inefficiency. As such, the capture of the Taliban’s Mullah Baradar will have major implications beyond that of the loss of an enemy field commander. Where Mullah Baradar turns up next will be a major indicator of the outcome of the negotiations with the Taliban and the future path of the conflict itself.

The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not necessarily reflect the views of either Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.