Intelligence in Canada: Adapt or Overhaul?
The primacy of position in the intelligence community must go to analysts…
Rumours are circulating in Ottawa that another Royal Commission of Inquiry may be held into intelligence matters in Canada.
Granted, rumours in Ottawa are common and the idea of yet another Royal Commission into intelligence may be seen as unappealing. However, recent events, such as the collapse of the National Security Certificate cases against Adil Charkaoui and Hassan Almrei, ongoing questions about terrorism, and how we do airport security may put the issue back on the front burner later this year.
Given the recent Royal Commissions such as the O’Connor Commission (Arar), the Iacobucci Inquiry (Almalki et al), and the still undelivered report of the Major Commission (Air India), it is a reasonable question to ask if there should be another inquiry at this time. Have we not already over studied the actions and capabilities of Canada’s intelligence and security community?
The answer is that another Royal Commission may be forthcoming anyway. Its findings and effects may be as significant and far reaching as the 1981 McDonald Commission which resulted in the creation of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service in 1984.
The issues that could drive such an Inquiry are many. Not the least of them are the experiences of intelligence and law enforcement since 9/11. By and large, law enforcement activities have worked out reasonably well, such as the successful prosecution of Momin Khawaja and the guilty pleas in the Toronto 18 case. As well, the often overlooked prosecution of Said Namouh in Quebec shows that police investigations and public trials can work. On the other side of the coin, the secret processes of intelligence in the National Security Certificate cases have resulted in extended delays, collapsed cases, accusations of prevarication against the government by a Federal Court judge, and serious financial expenditures. In another case, the intersection of intelligence and law enforcement capabilities did not go well. This was known as the “Arar Affair.”
Another potential reason for an Inquiry is the changing world around us. Our current intelligence and security arrangements were set up during the Cold War. The Cold War was very much a military and ideological struggle between two matched forces: the “West” and the Soviet Union. This is what was called a symmetrical conflict. The opposition or enemy was mostly “over there” and the balance of power was maintained by a rough equivalency in military and intelligence capabilities. The role of intelligence was very much confrontational, covert, and steeped in the overall conflict methodology of the Cold War. A major part of the time, “intelligence” was seen as a form of activity, using mostly technological resources to spy on an enemy which did the best it could to hide its capabilities and intentions. When the intelligences services did engage threats that were “over here,” it was usually a Soviet spy who was being caught and deported. The judicial systems of the Western countries were not engaged as the spies were not citizens and had no claim for any legal review of their status. The citizenry, when they were informed, were generally not worried or interested. After all, it was just some communist spy being deported.
Now, however, we are primairly involved in a series of asymmetric struggles against transnational terrorism, transnational organized crime, human smuggling, resource supply threats and other such activities. Many of the threats we face are not just “over there.” They are a direct combination of “over here” and “over there.” Many of the threats are coming from Canadian citizens (born here or naturalized) or from those claiming refugee status. Consequently, they have access to the legal system. The technological resources that served us so well in the Cold War are not usually effective in these cases. The threat is an “unlike” or asymmetrical threat and the response to such as threat must be led by knowledge, not by physical activity or power.
This reality has significant implications for intelligence. Rather than being seen as a form or activity or organization, intelligence must be seen as a form of knowledge. Rather than having intellection collection being driven by a technological capability, it must be driven by requirements. And most stunning (to some), the primacy of position in the intelligence community must be given to analysts, not collectors or “agents.”
The possible outcomes for such an Inquiry are extraordinary if they were to be explored. First, all national security investigations may become centralized in one agency rather than several. This could mean a new agency, rather than adapting the current Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). Alternatively, it may mean putting national security investigations back in the RCMP, but with their own oversight committee as an integral part of the operations. Putting a combination of intelligence and enforcement capabilities in one agency has been done successfully in other countries (Denmark) and it may be a model for Canada.
It may also mean the creation of a foreign intelligence collection capability or agency for Canada. All too often, Canadian security affairs are influenced by biased or unbalanced information provided by foreign intelligence services with their own agendas. At the same time, Canada government opinion can be shaped in an unbalanced way by organizations that are operating in Canada, but paid for by foreign money.
The most serious outcome, however, may be an attempt to change the culture of intelligence. The various agencies must adapt to the idea that knowledge, not secrets, are its primary goal. It must also accept the ideas that the strongest link in the intelligence community must be analysis. Merely collecting reams of data is not the answer, as this is intelligence as a form of activity. The future answers lie in intelligence as a form of knowledge with an increased focus on analsysis rather than collection. More changes to an organizational chart are not the answer. Major overhauls to adapt to new realities and requirements are required.
The opinions expressed in this blog are personal and do not reflect the views of Global Brief or the Glendon School of Public and International Affairs.
2 Responses to “Intelligence in Canada: Adapt or Overhaul?”
There’s a movement to radically change California government, by getting rid of career politicians and chopping their salaries in half. A group known as Citizens for California Reform wants to make the California legislature a part time time job, just like it was until 1966.
http://www.onlineuniversalwork.com
intelligence as knowledge not activity - love that.